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Abstract—It is becoming increasingly easy to automatically
replace a face of one person in a video with the face of another
person by using a pre-trained generative adversarial network
(GAN). Recent public scandals, e.g., the faces of celebrities being
swapped onto pornographic videos, call for automated ways to
detect these Deepfake videos. To help developing such methods, in
this paper, we present the first publicly available set of Deepfake
videos generated from videos of VidTIMIT database. We used
open source software based on GANs to create the Deepfakes,
and we emphasize that training and blending parameters can
significantly impact the quality of the resulted videos. To demon-
strate this impact, we generated videos with low and high visual
quality (320 videos each) using differently tuned parameter sets.
We showed that the state of the art face recognition systems based
on VGG and Facenet neural networks are vulnerable to Deepfake
videos, with 85.62% and 95.00% false acceptance rates (on high
quality versions) respectively, which means methods for detecting
Deepfake videos are necessary. By considering several baseline
approaches, we found that audio-visual approach based on lip-
sync inconsistency detection was not able to distinguish Deepfake
videos. The best performing method, which is based on visual
quality metrics and is often used in presentation attack detection
domain, resulted in 8.97% equal error rate on high quality
Deepfakes. Our experiments demonstrate that GAN-generated
Deepfake videos are challenging for both face recognition systems
and existing detection methods, and the further development of
face swapping technology will make it even more so.
Index Terms—Deepfake videos, Face swapping, Video
database, Tampering detection, Face recognition
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in automated video and audio editing tools,
generative adversarial networks (GANs), and social media
allow creation and fast dissemination of high quality tam-
pered video content. Such content already led to appearance
of deliberate misinformation, coined ‘fake news’, which is
impacting political landscapes of several countries [1]. A
recent surge of videos, often obscene, in which a face can be
swapped with someone else’s using neural networks, so called
Deepfakes1, are of a great public concern2. Accessible open
source software and apps for such face swapping lead to large
amounts of synthetically generated Deepfake videos appearing
in social media and news, posing a significant technical
challenge for detection and filtering of such content. Therefore,
the development of efficient tools that can automatically detect
these videos with swapped faces is of a paramount importance.
Until recently, most of the research was focusing on advanc-
ing the face swapping technology [2], [3], [4], [5]. However,
P. Korshunov and S. Marcel are at Idiap Research Institute, Martigny,
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1Open source: https://github.com/deepfakes/faceswap
2BBC report (Feb 3, 2018): http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42912529
responding to the public demand to detect face swapping
technology, researchers are starting to work on databases
and detection methods, including image and video data [6]
generated with an older face swapping approach Face2Face [7]
or videos collected using Snapchat3 application [8].
In this paper, we present a first publicly available database
of videos where faces are swapped using the open source
GAN-based approach4, which is developed from the orig-
inal autoencoder-based Deepfake algorithm1. We manually
selected 16 similar looking pairs of people from publicly
available VidTIMIT database5. For each 32 subject, we trained
two different models, in the paper, referred to as low quality
(LQ), with 64× 64 input/output size, and high quality (HQ),
with 128×128 size, models (see Figure 1 for examples). Since
there are 10 videos per person in VidTIMIT database, we
generated 320 videos corresponding to each version, resulting
in total 620 videos with faces swapped. For the audio, we kept
the original audio track of each video, i.e., no manipulation
was done to the audio channel.
It is also important to understand how much of a threat
Deepfake videos are to face recognition systems. Because if
these systems are not fooled by Deepfakes, creating a separate
system for detecting Deepfakes would not be necessary. To
the vulnerability of face recognition to Deepfake videos, we
evaluate two state of the art systems: based on VGG [9] and
Facenet6 [10] neural networks on both untampered videos and
videos with faces swapped.
For detection of the Deepfakes, we first used an audio-
visual approach that detects inconsistency between visual lip
movements and speech in audio [11]. It allows us to under-
stand how well the generated Deepfakes can mimic mouth
movement and whether the lips are synchronized with the
speech. We also applied several baseline methods from pre-
sentation attack detection domain, by treating Deepfake videos
as digital presentation attacks [8], including simple principal
component analysis (PCA) and linear discriminant analysis
(LDA) approaches, and the approach based on image quality
metrics (IQM) and support vector machine (SVM) [12], [13].
To allow researchers to verify, reproduce, and extend our
work, we provide the database of Deepfake videos7, face
recognition and Deepfake detection systems with correspond-
ing scores as an open source Python package8.
Therefore, this paper has the following main contributions:
3https://www.snapchat.com/
4https://github.com/shaoanlu/faceswap-GAN
5http://conradsanderson.id.au/vidtimit/
6https://github.com/davidsandberg/facenet
7https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/deepfaketimit
8Complete implementation: https://gitlab.idiap.ch/bob/bob.report.deepfakes
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Fig. 1: Screenshot of the original videos from VidTIMIT database and low (LQ) and high quality (HQ) Deepfake videos.
• Publicly available database of low and high quality sets
of videos from VidTIMIT database with swapped faces
using GAN-based approach;
• Vulnerability analysis of VGG and Facenet based face
recognition systems;
• Evaluation of several detection methods of Deepfakes,
including lip-syncing approach and image quality metrics
with SVM method;
II. RELATED WORK
One of the first works on face swapping is by Bitouk et
al. [14], where the authors searched in a database for a face
similar in appearance to the input face and then focused on
perfecting the blending of the found face into the input image.
The main motivation for this work was de-identification of an
input face and its privacy preservation. Hence, the approach
did not allow for a seamless swapping of any two given
faces. Until the latest era of neural networks, most of the
techniques for face swapping or facial reenacment were based
on similarity searchers between faces or face patches in target
and source video and various blending techniques [15], [16],
[17], [18], [4].
The first approach that used a generative adversarial network
to train a model between pre-selected two faces was proposed
by Korshunova et al. in 2017 [3]. Another related work with
even a more ambitious idea was to use long short term
memory (LSTM) based architecture to synthesize a mouth
feature solely from an audio speech [19]. Right after these
publication became public, they attracted a lot of publicity.
Open source approaches replicating these techniques started
to appear, which resulted in the Deepfake phenomena.
The rapid spread of Deepfakes and the ease of generating
such videos are calling for a reliable detection method. So far,
however, there are only few publications focusing on detecting
GAN-generated videos with swapped faces and very little
data for evaluation and benchmarking is publicly available.
For instance, Zhang et al. [20] proposed the method based
on speeded up robust features (SURF) descriptors and SVM
classifier. The authors evaluated this approach on a set of
images where the face of one person was replaced with a
face of another by applying color correction and smoothing
techniques based on Gasussian blurring, which means the fa-
cial expressions of the input faces were not preserved. Another
method based on LBP-like features with SVM classifier was
proposed by Agarwal et al. [8] and evaluated on the videos
collected by the authors with Snapchat3 phone application.
Snapchat uses active 3D model to swap faces in real time, so
the resulted videos are not really Deepfakes, but it is still a
widely used tool and database of such videos, if it will ever
become public (the authors promised to release it but have not
done so at the moment of publication), it can be interesting to
research community.
Ro¨ssler et al. [6] presented the most comprehensive
database of non-Deepfake swapped faces (500′000 images
from more than 1000 videos) to date. The authors also
benchmarked the state of the art forgery classification and
segmentation methods. The authors used Face2Face [7] tool
to generate the database, which is based on expression trans-
formation using 3D facial model and a pre-computed database
of mouth interiors. One of the latest approaches [21] proposed
to use blinking detection as the means to distinguish swapped
faces in Deepfake videos. The authors generated 49 videos (not
publicly available) and argued that the proposed eye blinking
detection was effective in detecting Deepfake videos.
However, no public Deepfake video database where GAN-
based approach was applied is available. Hence, it is unclear
whether the above methods would be effective in detecting
such faces. In fact, the Deepfakes that we have generated can
effectively mimic the facial expressions, mouth movements,
and blinking, so the current detection approaches need to
be evaluated on such videos. For instance, it is practically
impossible to evaluate the methods proposed in [6] and [21]
as their implementations are not yet available.
III. DEEPFAKE DATABASE
As original data, we took video from VidTIMIT database5.
The database contains 10 videos for each of 43 subjects,
which were shot in controlled environment with people facing
camera and reciting predetermined short phrases. From these
43 subject, we manually selected 16 pairs in such a way
that subjects in the same pair have similar prominent visual
features, e.g., mustaches or hairs styles. Using GAN-based
3face-swapping algorithm based on the available code4, for each
pair, we generated videos with swapped faces from subject
one to subject two and visa versa (see Figure 1 for the video
screenshots).
For each pair of subjects, we have trained two different
GAN models and generated two versions of the videos:
1) The low quality (LQ) model has input and output image
(facial regions only) of size 64× 64. About 200 frames
from the videos of each subject were used for training
and the frames were extracted at 4 fps from the original
videos. The training was done for 10′000 iterations and
took about 4 hours per model on Tesla P40 GPU.
2) The high quality (HQ) model has input/output image
size of 128× 128. About 400 frames extracted at 8 fps
from videos were used for training, which was done for
20′000 iterations (about 12 hours on Tesla P40 GPU).
Also, different blending techniques were used for different
models. For LQ model, for each frame, a face was generated
using a frame from a target video as an input. Then a facial
mask was detected using a CNN-based face segmentation
algorithm proposed in [4]. Using this mask, the generated
face was blended with the face in the target video. For HQ
model, the blending was done based on facial landmarks
alignment between generated face and the original face in the
target video. Landmarks detection was done using publicly
available pre-trained MTCNN model [22]. Finally, histogram
normalization was applied when blending generated face into
the target video to adjust for the lighting conditions.
A. Evaluation protocol
When evaluating vulnerability of face recognition, for the
licit non-tampered scenario, we used the original VidTIMIT
videos for the 32 subjects for which we have generated
corresponding Deepfake videos. In this scenario, we used 2
videos of the subject for enrollment and the other 8 videos as
probes, for which we computed the verification scores.
From the scores, for each possible threshold θ, we computed
commonly used metrics for evaluation of classification sys-
tems: false acceptance rate (FAR) and false reject rate (FRR).
Threshold at which these FAR and FRR are equal leads to an
equal error rate (EER), which is commonly used as a single
value metric of the system performance.
To evaluate vulnerability of face recognition to Deepfake
videos, in tampered scenario, we use these videos (10 for
each of 32 subjects) as probes and compute the corresponding
scores using the same enrollment model as in licit scenario. To
understand if face recognition perceives Deepfakes as similar
to the genuine original videos, we report the FAR metric
computed using EER threshold θ from licit scenario. If FAR
value for Deepfake tampered videos is significantly higher
than the one computed in licit scenario, it means the face
recognition system cannot distinguish tampered videos from
originals and is therefore vulnerable to Deepfakes.
When evaluating Deepfake detection, we consider it as
a binary classification problem and evaluate the ability of
detection approaches to distinguish original videos from Deep-
fake videos. All videos in the dataset, including genuine and
tampered parts, were split into training (Train) and evaluation
(Test) subsets. To avoid bias during training and testing, we
arranged that the same subject would not appear in both sets.
We did not introduce a development set, which is typically
used to tune hyper parameters such as threshold, because the
dataset is not large enough. Therefore, we report the EER and
the FRR (using the threshold when FAR = 10%) values on
the Test set.
IV. ANALYSIS OF DEEPFAKE VIDEOS
In this section, we evaluate the vulnerability of face
VGG [9] and Facenet9 [10] based recognition systems to
videos with swapped faces and apply several baseline systems
for detection of such videos.
A. Vulnerability of face recognition
We used publicly available pre-trained VGG and Facenet
architectures for face recognition. We used the fc7 and bot-
tleneck layers of these networks, respectively, as features and
used cosine distance as a classifier. For a given test face, the
confidence score of whether it belongs to a pre-enrolled model
of a person is the cosine distance between the average feature
vector, i.e., model, and the features vector of a test face. Both
of these systems are state of the art recognition systems with
VGG of 98.95% [9] and Facenet of 99.63% [10] accuracies
on labeled faces in the wild (LFW) dataset.
We conducted the vulnerability analysis of VGG and
Facenet-based face recognition systems on low quality (LQ)
and high quality (HQ) face swaps in VidTIMIT database. In
a licit scenario when only original non-tampered videos are
present, both systems performed very well, with EER value of
0.03% for VGG and 0.00% for Facenet-based system. Using
the EER threshold from licit scenario, we computed FAR value
for the scenario when Deepfake videos are used as probes.
In this case, for VGG the FAR is 88.75% LQ Deepfakes
and 85.62% for HQ Deepfakes, and for Facenet the FAR is
94.38% and 95.00% for LQ and HQ Deepfakes respectively.
To illustrate this vulnerability, we plot the score histograms
for high quality Deepfake videos in Figure 2.
From the results, it is clear that both VGG and Facenet
based systems cannot effectively distinguish GAN-generated
and swapped faces from the original ones. The fact that more
advanced Facenet system is more vulnerable is also consistent
with the previous findings [23].
B. Detection of Deepfake videos
We considered several baseline Deepfake detection systems,
including system that uses audio-visual data to detect incon-
sistencies between lip movements and audio speech, as well
as, several variations of solely image based systems.
The goal of the lip-sync based detection system is to
distinguish genuine video, where lip movement and speech are
synchronized, from tampered video, where lip movements and
audio, which may not necessarily be speech, are not synchro-
nized. The stages of such system include feature extraction
9https://github.com/davidsandberg/facenet
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Fig. 2: Histograms showing the vulnerability of VGG and Facenet based face recognition to high quality face-swapping and
the performance of IQM+SVM detection on low and high quality Deepfakes.
from video and audio modalities, processing these features,
and then, a two-class classifier trained to separate tampered
videos from genuine. In this system, we used MFCCs as audio
features [24] and distances between mouth landmarks as visual
features (inspired by [19]). PCA is applied to the joint audio-
visual features to reduce the dimensionality of the blocks of
features and long short-term memory (LSTM) [25] network
is trained to separate tampered and non-tampered videos as
proposed in [11].
As image based systems, we implemented the following:
• Pixels+PCA+LDA: use raw faces as features with PCA-
LDA classifier, with 99% retained variance resulting in
446 dimensions of transform matrix.
• IQM+PCA+LDA: IQM features with PCA-LDA classifier
with 95% retained variance resulting in 2 dimensions of
transform matrix.
• IQM+SVM: IQM features with SVM classifier, each
video has an averaged score from 20 frames.
The systems based on image quality measures (IQM) are
borrowed from the domain of presentation (including replay
attacks) attack detection, where such systems have shown good
performance [12], [13]. As IQM feature vector, we used 129
measures of image quality, which include such measures like
signal to noise ratio, specularity, bluriness, etc., by combining
the features from [12] and [13].
The results for all detection systems are presented in Table I.
Figure 2c shows the detection error tradeoff (DET) curves
for the best performing IQM+SVM system applied to two
different face swapping versions. The results demonstrate that
first, lip-syncing based algorithm is not able to detect face
swapping, as GANs are able to generate facial expressions
with high quality that can match audio speech. Therefore,
currently, only image based approaches are capable to effec-
tively detect Deepfake videos. Second, the IQM+SVM system
has a reasonably high accuracy of detecting Deepfake videos,
although videos generated with HQ model pose a more serious
challenge. It means that a more advanced techniques for face
swapping will be even more challenging to detect.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a first publicly available database
of 620 Deepfake videos for 16 pairs of subjects from Vid-
TABLE I: Baseline detection systems for low (LQ) and high
quality (HQ) Deepfake videos of VidTIMIT database. EER
and FRR when FAR equal to 10% are computed on Test set.
Database Detection system EER (%) FRR@FAR10% (%)
LSTM lip-sync [11] 41.8 81.67
LQ Deepfake Pixels+PCA+LDA 39.48 78.10
IQM+PCA+LDA 20.52 66.67
IQM+SVM 3.33 0.95
HQ Deepfake IQM+SVM 8.97 9.05
TIMIT database. We generated two versions of the videos
for each subject: based on low quality 64 × 64 GAN model
and higher quality 128 × 128 model. We also demonstrated
that state of the art VGG and Facenet-based face recognition
algorithms are vulnerable to the Deepfake videos and fail to
distinguish such videos from the original ones with up to
95.00% equal error rate. We also evaluated several baseline
face swap detection algorithms and found that lip-sync based
approach fails to detect mismatches between lip movement and
speech. The techniques based on image quality measures with
SVM classifier can detect HQ Deepfake videos with 8.97%
equal error rate.
However, the continued advancements in development of
face swapping techniques will result in more challenging
Deepfake videos, which will be harder to detect by the
existing algorithms. Therefore, new databases and new more
generic methods need to be developed in the future. Subjective
evaluations to study the vulnerability of human subjects to
Deepfakes are also needed. Possibly, a new arms race between
Deepfake methods and detection algorithms has begun.
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